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25 July 1951

SUGGESTED REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 24.

24. If the Korean conflict continues or is renewed after a cease fire, the Kremlin will probably continue to aid the Communists in ways which will not involve serious danger of a break between the USSR and US/UN, and which will therefore not preclude the ending of the Korean conflict by political negotiation whenever disengagement serves Soviet interests. If, however, the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto local war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist.

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

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GLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 1991

NEXT REVIEW WATLI

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 127-68 REVIEWER: 009256

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000600020007-5